Futures exchanges and other financial intermediaries assume counterparty risks and demand in return guarantees that these counterparties will deliver on their promises. It is often argued that to attract volume, financial intermediaries would settle for excessively low contractual guarantees. In Tano Santos and José Scheinkman (2001) we model financial intermediation in an environment where traders may choose to default, and we examine the characteristics of the equilibrium. In particular, we investigate whether competition implies excessively low standards. We show that in fact, when society punishes default and intermediaries can impose collateral requirements to effectively limit the size of positions, competition leads to a (constrained) optimal amount of contractual guarantees.
guarantees.
In Santos and Scheinkman (2001) we assume that exchanges cannot control the size of the positions taken by individuals, but we preclude investors from participating in more than one exchange. This ignores the effect that trading with one financial intermediary may have on the risks faced by other intermediaries. Financial intermediaries typically cannot control the amount of risk that counterparties will take with other intermediaries.
In this paper we examine the effect of dropping this exclusivity assumption. We show that the constrained optimum can no longer be implemented as a standard Nash equilibrium with free entry. Nonetheless this allocation is the only one that can be sustained as an anticipatory equilibrium (Charles Wilson (1977) ). To break a candidate anticipatory * Santos: Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 East 58th Street, Chicago, IL, 60637 ; Scheinkman: Department of Economics, Princeton University, 26 Prospect Avenue, Princeton, NJ, 08540-5296. This research was supported by NSF's grant SES-0001647. We dedicate this paper to our friend and colleague Merton Miller who read an earlier draft and gave us, as he had in many other occasions, superb comments. 1 equilibrium it must possible to add a contract that is profitable and that does not become unprofitable when the now unprofitable contracts from the original menu are withdrawn.
If one views this requirement as reasonable, non-exclusivity reproduces the outcome that obtains when intermediaries enjoy exclusivity but cannot control the size of positions taken against them by traders.
A superficially similar result holds in the insurance model of Richard Arnott and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1993) . In that model, the price of insurance is simply the ratio of what the client pays in the favorable state versus what he receives in the adverse state.
As a consequence, if insurers cannot control the size of policies, it makes no difference whether a client buys from one or many insurance companies -clients will buy as much as desired at the lowest price. As we will see below, in our model of financial intermediation, agents may want to combine several contracts, and this is precisely the reason why the original equilibrium does not survive as a Nash equilibrium once exclusivity is dropped.
I. A model of competition among financial intermediaries
There are two periods. In the first period only asset trading occurs. In the second period, there are two equally probable observable states of the world, s 1 and s 2 . There is a large number of agents. In each state, half the agents receive an endowment of x units of the consumption good. The other half "typically" receives a larger endowment y.
However, each of these agents have a small probability 1 − π of receiving z < x, instead of y. The occurrence of this bad draw is private information and is independent across agents.
, so that agents want to transfer consumption to the state where they obtain the certain endowment.
Because first period endowments are zero, exchanges compete for customers by issuing forwards. To focus on the ability of the marketed contracts to spread risks among investors, assume that exchanges must break even in each state of the world. Contracts treat groups symmetrically. The forward is normalized so that the party that is long must deliver one unit of the good in state s 2 . To finance defaults, the exchange delivers K < 1 units for each unit of the contract that is in-the-money.
1 In Santos and Scheinkman (2001) we consider the case where an agent's π is private information.
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Exchanges also impose margin requirements. When a trader deposits collateral C, this amount is taken from his endowment and delivered to the exchange to satisfy claims the exchange has on the agent. Hence C cannot exceed the minimum endowment that the trader will have in a state where he is required to deliver to the exchange. Consistent with the search for a symmetric outcome, and to make the model robust to splitting and pooling orders, each exchange chooses a Φ ≥ 0, and demands that each unit (long or short) of the contract be secured by Φ units of the good as collateral. Investors can take any long or short position in the marketed asset. However, if an agent defaults his positions are netted. Since K < 1, agents would never simultaneously take a long and a short position. The fact that exchanges cannot price discriminate as a function of the size of trades creates a moral-hazard aspect to our problem.
As in Martin Shubik and Charles Martin (1977) we introduce a penalty on utility that is proportional to the amount that the individual fails to deliver. If an agent is committed to deliver w and delivers D, he suffers a utility loss of λ max(w − D, 0). The parameter λ is economy-wide, and exchanges cannot alter it. Assume that u (x) < u (z) − λ, so that it does not pay to transfer consumption from the state where endowment is z to the state where it is x, even after accounting for reduced penalties. To eliminate one multiplier, assume that z is sufficiently small relative to y, so that agents that receive y will always deliver more than the collateral.
A trader in an exchange that offers a contract γ = (Φ, K), must choose a position, and how many units to deliver when out-of-the-money. A simple calculation shows that each agent's problem has a unique solution, that group 1 agents take a long position, and by symmetry agents in group 2 take the negative of the position taken by agents in group 1. Since u (z) > λ, an agent that receives z will make no deliveries in excess of collateral.
When endowed with y, the investor will equate the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal penalty λ. If u (y − θ * ) = λ, a group 1 agent that is long θ contracts and receives endowment y will fully deliver, if θ ≤ θ * . Otherwise, given our assumptions, he
We use a standard Nash equilibrium where firms compete in contracts. Since we have constant returns, we may assume that, in equilibrium, all agents trade in the same exchange. In Santos and Scheinkman (2001) we show that the equilibrium contract
yields maximum utility among those that at least break even (see figure 1 below). 2 In equilibrium, agents of group 1 buy θ * contracts and hence agents that receive y do not default. Since the contract yields zero profit,
In Santos and Scheinkman (2001) we argue that a central planner facing the same restrictions as our exchanges can do no better than the allocation supported by γ * . In this sense the equilibrium is a constrained optimum.
II. Non-exclusivity
If agents can simultaneously trade in several exchanges, we must choose a sharing rule in case of default. We assume that exchanges keep any collateral they have received.
Additional deliveries are shared in proportion to the amount owed to each exchange. Here and in what follows we assume that Φ * > 0. This holds whenever penalties are not too high.
See Santos and Scheinkman (2001 that is preferred to γ * . From our characterization of γ * , we know that any contract, that is preferred to γ * produces losses. Since the entrant is making a profit, the incumbent must now be making losses. These losses result from an increase in the rate of default on the incumbent's contracts.
It is now natural to suppose that the incumbent withdraws the contract γ * , leaving γ e as the only available contract. If any contract that makes a profit in the presence of γ * makes losses when it is the only one available, then the original allocation is an anticipatory equilibrium. In fact, as we show in the appendix, the zero-profit line (line zpl in figure 1 ) lies below the line tt . Any contract that can attract trades in the presence of γ * must produce losses when it is the only contract available, that is, there exists an anticipatory equilibrium where all active intermediaries offer γ * . Also, in any candidate anticipatory equilibrium, the portfolio chosen by traders does not bring losses. If this portfolio is not equivalent to γ * , an entrant can introduce a contract that generates profits whether or not the original contracts are withdrawn. Hence any anticipatory equilibrium must be equivalent to one where active intermediaries offer γ * .
We have assumed until now that each intermediary offers a single contract. Intermediaries may want to offer contracts that are not necessary to implement the equilibrium, but that deter entrants, as in the insurance model of Alberto Bisin and Danilo Guaitoli (1999) . These contracts are present principally as threats to a potential entrant. However, if there are costs to maintaining each contract, in equilibrium, contracts which are not needed to implement the equilibrium allocation would not be offered, and the analysis in this paper can accommodate intermediaries that issue multiple contracts.
